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Abstract
Quantum theory has recently been employed to further ad-
vance the theory of information retrieval (IR). A challenging
research topic is to investigate the so called quantum-like in-
terference in users’ relevance judgment process, where users
are involved to judge the relevance degree of each document
with respect to a given query. In this process, users’ relevance
judgment for the current document is often interfered by the
judgment for previous documents, due to the interference on
users’ cognitive status. Research from cognitive science has
demonstrated some initial evidence of quantum-like cogni-
tive interference in human decision making, which underpins
the user’s relevance judgment process. This motivates us to
model such cognitive interference in the relevance judgment
process, which in our belief will lead to a better modeling and
explanation of user behaviors in relevance judgement process
for IR and eventually lead to more user-centric IR models.
In this paper, we propose to use probabilistic automaton (PA)
and quantum finite automaton (QFA), which are suitable to
represent the transition of user judgment states, to dynami-
cally model the cognitive interference when the user is judg-
ing a list of documents.
Introduction
Increasingly, information retrieval (IR) techniques are un-
derpinning daily information seeking and management
tools, such as the popular search engines. Despite the
success of IR applications, there has been an urging de-
mand for advanced theoretical frameworks, especially to
support the emerging context-sensitive and user-centric IR
systems which are compatible with human information pro-
cessing and cognition. Following van Rijsbergen’s pioneer-
ing work (2004), which has shown the potential of quan-
tum theory (QT) to subsume the major IR models into a
single mathematical formalism in Hilbert vector spaces, re-
searchers proposed many QT-based models in a number of
areas, e.g., contextual IR (Melucci 2008), interactive IR
(Piwowarski and Lalmas 2009a, 2009b), lexical semantic
spaces (Bruza and Cole 2005; Hou and Song 2009), and
quantum-like interference in IR (Zuccon et al. 2009, 2010;
Melucci 2010).
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This paper is a step further along the direction of inves-
tigating the quantum-like interference in a central IR pro-
cess - user’s relevance judgment, where users are involved
to judge the relevance degree of documents with respect to
a given query. In this process, users’ relevance judgment
for the current document is often interfered by the judgment
for previously seen documents, as a result of cognitive in-
terference. A typical scenario is that, after finding a more
relevant document, a user may lower the relevance degree
of a previously judged document. For example, when a user
judges whether a document d0 about “the theory of relativ-
ity” is relevant to the query “Albert Einstein”, the user might
initially think it is 90% relevant. However, after viewing an-
other document d1 introducing all the aspects of Einstein,
the user is likely to consider d1 as almost 100% relevant, yet
the relevance of d0 may be lowered accordingly. Capturing
such cognitive interference, in our belief, will lead to more
user-centric IR models.
Research from the cognitive science (Khrennikov 2004;
Busemeyer et al. 2007; 2009) has demonstrated initial ev-
idence about the quantum (or quantum-like) nature of the
cognitive interference involved in human decision making,
which underpins the relevance judgment process in IR. The
cognitive experiment showed that the participants’ proba-
bility for making certain decision could be interfered by a
previous categorization task in a non-classical manner: the
classical (Kolmogorov) law of total probability (CLTP) was
violated. It has been argued that classical Markov model
with transition probabilities from category states to decision
states was insufficient to model the probability differences,
while the quantum model provided a natural way to bridge
the gap between non-interfered probabilities and interfered
probabilities.
This sheds light for us on the formal modeling of the cog-
nitive interference in the users’ relevance judgement pro-
cess. However, different from the approach in cognitive sci-
ence (Busemeyer et al. 2009), we will present how an alter-
native Markov approach, in which transitions are between
decision states, rather than (transitions) from category states
to decision states, is able to model the above cognitive inter-
ference. Similarly, the transition between users’ judgment
states can model the corresponding cognitive interference in
the relevance judgment process. The judgment states corre-
spond to the relevance degrees of documents, e.g., relevant
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(R), partially relevant (P), and irrelevant (I).
Fomally, we propose to use a probabilistic automaton
(PA) (Tzeng 1992), which is a generalization of Markov
models, to dynamically model the cognitive interference
when user is judging a list of documents. Specifically, the
states in PA represent the judgment states of users; differ-
ent input symbols of PA represent different kinds of cogni-
tive interference generated by viewing other documents; and
each symbol is associated with a (Markov) transition matrix
to encode the transition probabilities among judgment states.
Moreover, PA can accept a finite string of symbols, making
it possible to dynamically model the cognitive interference
when users are judging a ranking of documents.
In addition to PA, we also present its quantum counter-
part, namely quantum finite automaton (QFA) (Kondacs and
Watrous 1997), to model the cognitive interference and show
its potential advantages over the PA.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to
formally model the cognitive interference in the document
relevance judgement process. In the IR literature, the dy-
namic nature of relevance and the effects of document pre-
sentation order on relevance judgment have been addressed
in (Mizzaro 1996; Eisenberg and Barry 1988). Recently,
Zuccon et al. (2009; 2010) proposed a quantum probability
ranking principle (QPRP), which incorporates the approxi-
mation (i.e., the interference term estimated by the similar-
ity between non-ranked document and ranked documents)
of the quantum interference term into the classical probabil-
ity ranking principle (PRP) to revise the document ranking
scores. QPRP is the first successful application of quantum-
like IR methods and has achieved a promising performance
on large scale collections. However, QPRP can be regarded
as a system-centric approach, since it is concerned about
the document ranking by the system. Different from QPRP,
our approach is focused on user’s relevance judgment pro-
cess: having judged the relevance of other documents will
lead to the user’s change of cognitive status and in turn in-
terfere with his/her judgment of current document. In our
opinion, system-centric approach implicitly assumes that the
relevance is a reality feature (or an objective property) of
documents, while the user-centric approach is to investigate
the non-reality feature (or subjective property) of relevance,
which coincides with the non-reality principle of quantum
theory.
Cognitive Interference in Human Decision
Making
In this section, we start with a description of Busemeyer et
al.’s cognitive experiment in human decision making and
their formulation on the cognitive interference. Then, we
present an alternative Markov approach to model the cogni-
tive interference.
In (Busemeyer and Wang 2007; Busemeyer, Wang, and
Lambert-Mogiliansky 2009), researchers presented some
experimental results that demonstrated the nonclassical na-
ture of the cognitive interference, evidenced by the violation
of the classical law of total probability (CLTP), in a human
decision making task. Participants were shown pictures of
human faces and asked to make a decision about how they
would react to the faces. Two experimental settings were
predefined. In setting 1, the participants were asked to de-
cide (D-only) whether to take a ‘attack (A)’ or ‘withdraw
(W)’ action. In setting 2, the participants were asked to first
categorize (C step) the face as belonging to either a ‘good
(G)’ or a ‘bad (B)’ guy, and then decide (C-then-D) their
actions (A or W). The experiment was carried out in a well
controlled environment to ensure less distraction to the par-
ticipants and more randomness in assigning participants to
different experimental settings.
Violation of CLTP in Human Decision
Through this experiment, various probabilities1, includ-
ing P (A) and P (W ) in setting 1, and P (G), P (A|G),
P (W |G), P (B), P (A|B) and P (W |B) in setting 2, can be
obtained. These probabilities are denoted for short as pA and
pW in setting 1, and pG, TAG, TWG, pB , TAB and TWB in
setting 2, respectively. The following observation from the
experiment indicates the violation of CLTP:[
pA
pW
]T
=
[
pG · TAG + pB · TAB
pG · TWG + pB · TWB
]T
(1)
The above formula shows that the non-interfered probabil-
ities on the left-hand side are different from the interfered
probabilities on the right hand side.
A Markov Model Explanation
To model and explain the phenomenon, Busemeyer et
al. (2009) considered the right-hand side of Formula 1 as
a Markov model. They defined two category states, G and
B, and two decision states, A and W. The 2 × 1 row vector
PC = [pG pB] represents the initial probabilities of the two
category states in setting 2. The 2× 2 matrix
T =
[
TAG TWG
TAB TWB
]
(2)
can represent the probabilities of transiting from each cate-
gory states to each decision states. Specifically, Tj,i repre-
sents probability of transiting from category state j (G or B)
to decision state i (A or W). T is transition matrix (a right
stochastic matrix), which means each row of T sums to one.
Then, the right-hand side of Formula 1 equals to PC · T , a
standard Markov process. Let PF = [pFA pFW ] = PC · T ,
where pFA and pFW are the probabilities predicted by the
Markov Model. Hence, Formula 1 can be rewritten as:[
pA
pW
]T
=
[
pFA
pFW
]T
=
[
pG · TAG + pB · TAB
pG · TWG + pB · TWB
]T
(3)
It turns out that the predicted probabilities of the Markov
model are still different from the probabilities in the setting
1. Moreover, this Markov approach still can not bridge the
probability differences in the two different settings.
1In this section, for a better readability, some notations and
formulation in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 of (Busemeyer, Wang, and
Lambert-Mogiliansky 2009) are slightly modified
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Quantum Model Explanation
Later, Busemeyer et al. (2009) proposed to use quantum the-
ory to explain the violation of CLTP. In quantum theory, the
probabilities are derived from the squared magnitudes of the
amplitudes. For example, an amplitude q is a complex num-
ber q = r · [cos θ + i sin θ], where i = √−1, r ∈ [0, 1]
is the magnitude, θ ∈ [0, 2π) is the phrase. The squared
magnitude q · q∗ = r2 ≤ 1.
Two category states, |G〉 and |B〉, as well as two decision
states, |A〉 and |W 〉, were defined. The 2 × 1 row vector
QC = [qG qB] represents the initial amplitudes for the cat-
egory states, where |qG|2 = pG and |qB|2 = pB . The 2× 2
matrix
U =
[
UAG UWG
UAB UWB
]
(4)
represents the amplitudes for transiting from each category
state to each decision state, where U is a unitary matrix2
and |Ui,j |2 = Ti,j . Then, the predicted amplitudes by the
quantum model can be represented as
QF =
[
QFA
QFW
]T
= QC ·U =
[
qG · UAG + qB · UAB
qG · UWG + qB · UWB
]T
(5)
The corresponding probabilities by quantum model are
»
|QFA|
2
|QFW |
2
–T
=
»
|qG|
2|UAG|
2+|qB |
2|UAB |
2+2 · |qG||UAG||qB ||UAB | cos(θ)
|qG|
2|UWG|
2+|qB |
2|UWB |
2+2 · |qG||UWG||qB ||UWB | cos(τ )
–T
≈
»
pG · TAG + pB · TAB + Interference(θ)
pG · TWG + pB · TWB + Interference(τ )
–T
(6)
It shows that the quantum probabilities do not necessar-
ily obey the CLTP due to the existence of the interference
term, e.g., 2 · |qG||UAG||qB||UAB| cos(θ). As a result, these
probabilities
[|QFA|2 |QFW |2] of quantum model are dif-
ferent from the predicted probabilities [pFA pFW ] of the
Markov model in Formula 3. In (Busemeyer, Wang, and
Lambert-Mogiliansky 2009), they have shown that using
a well trained cos(θ), cos(τ) and fitted unitary matrices,[|QFA|2 |QFW |2] can predict [pA pW ] more exactly.
An Alternative Markov Approach
We think that the cognitive interference observed in the
above human decision task can be modeled by an alterna-
tive Markov approach.
First, we assume in general that if there does not exist
cognitive interference, the CLTP should hold; otherwise, the
CLTP can be violated. For the experiment in (Busemeyer,
Wang, and Lambert-Mogiliansky 2009), this assumption
means that if there was no cognitive interference in setting
2 (i.e., the participants’ C-step does not interfere with the
D-step), the CLTP should hold . Otherwise, the probability
difference between both sides can be generated.
2To make sure that U is a unitary matrix, |Ui,j |
2 just need to be
fitted to approximate Ti,j
If no cognitive interference exists in setting 2, we let TNAG,
TNAB, T
N
WG and T
N
WB be the non-interfered conditional prob-
abilities in setting 2, which correspond to the interfered ones
TAG, TAB, TWG and TWB in Formula 1, respectively. No-
tice that different from T(·), the T
N
(·) are just for theoretical
analysis and are actually not observed from the experimental
data. We let
PN =
[
pNA
pNW
]T
=
[
pG · TNAG + pB · TNAB
pG · TNWG + pB · TNWB
]T
(7)
where pNA and pNW denote the non-interfered probabilities
with respect to action A and W, respectively in setting 2.
According to our assumption, the CLTP should hold, which
means [
pA
pW
]T
=
[
pNA
pNW
]T
(8)
where the left-hand side is actually the left-hand side of For-
mula 1, while the right-hand side is just for theoretical anal-
ysis but not observed from the data.
If there exists cognitive interference in setting 2, the CLTP
does not hold, which gives us
PI =
[
pIA
pIW
]T
=
[
pG · TAG + pB · TAB
pG · TWG + pB · TWB
]T
(9)
where the PI = [pIA pIW ] represents the interfered proba-
bilities in setting 2, and are actually equivalent to the right-
hand side of Formula 1. Hence, the violation of CLTP in
Formula 1 can be rewritten as:[
pA
pW
]T
=
[
pIA
pIW
]T
(10)
From the above four Formulae, it turns out that the prob-
lem to explain the violation of the CLTP in Formula 10 is
equivalent to the problem of explaining the difference be-
tween PN and PI (i.e., two right-hand sides of Formula 8
and 10, respectively) and how to bridge the difference. No-
tice that under our assumption, the quantum explanation in
Formula 6 can also be regarded as an approach to explain
the difference between PN and PI and use an interference
term to bridge the difference.
The difference between PN and PI is generated by the
difference between TN(·) and T(·) (see Formula 7 and For-
mula 9). We think this is due to the transition between the
decision states (A or W), which can be formulated by a stan-
dard Markov transition matrix (or called a right stochastic
matrix):
M(α) =
[
MAA MAW
MWA MWW
]
(11)
where M(α)i,j (i, j ∈ {A,W}) represents the probabilities
of transiting from a decision state i to another decision state
j, and different M(α)3 represent different cognitive inter-
ference effects of the category state α(α ∈ {G,B}). Hence,
3It should be noted that M(α) is different from T (see For-
mula 2), in the sense that M(α) represents the transition proba-
bilities between decision states, while T represents the transition
probabilities from category states to decision states.
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the cognitive interference process can be formulated as fol-
lows:
[TAG TWG] = [T
N
AG T
N
WG]×M(G)
[TAB TWB] = [T
N
AB T
N
WB]×M(B)
(12)
If each M(i) is an identity matrix, it means that categoriz-
ing the face does not interfere with participants’ decisions
on their actions. Otherwise, according to Formula 12, the
C-step interferes with the D-step, making the difference be-
tween TN(·) and T(·), and then the difference between PN
and PI . The transition matrices M(G) and M(B) can be
regarded as a connection between TN(·) and T(·) , and then
bridge the difference between PN and PI .
For example, in Formula 12, [TNAG T
N
WG] = [0.8 0.2]
means that without interference in setting 2, for the partic-
ipants who categorized the face as belonging to a ‘good’
(G) guy, 80% of them decided to ‘attack’ (A) and 20% de-
cided to ‘withdraw’ (W). If the transition matrixM(G) is an
identity matrix, then [TAG TWG] = [T
N
AG T
N
WG], which
indicates that the category state G does not interfere with
the decision states. Otherwise, suppose the transition ma-
trix M(G) =
[
0.4 0.6
0.7 0.3
]
, which means that for the par-
ticipants (see the transition probabilities in the first row of
M(G)) who first decided to attack, 40% would stick to their
initial decisions while 60% would change their decisions to
withdraw; for the participants (see the second row) who first
decided to withdraw, 70% would change their decisions to
attack while 30% would stay on their initial decisions. Af-
ter the cognitive interference represented by [TNAG T
N
WG]×
M(G), the interfered probabilities are [TAG TWG] =
[0.8 0.2] ×
[
0.4 0.6
0.7 0.3
]
= [0.46 0.54], which is dif-
ferent from the non-interfered probabilities.
Further Comparison between the Above Models
From Formula 12, one may think that we are using transi-
tion matrices and non-interfered probabilities to predict the
interfered probabilities. This is different from that in the
quantum model (Formula 6), where they are using an inter-
ference term and interfered probabilities to predict the non-
interfered ones. We should mention that: firstly, through the
inverse operation of Formula 12, one can also predict the
non-interfered probabilities; secondly, to predict the inter-
fered decisions is actually more important in the user rele-
vance judgment process.
Automata Modeling for Cognitive
Interference in Relevance Judgment
In the previous section, we have shown the possibility of
using Markov approach to model the cognitive interference
in human decision making context.
Now, we investigate the cognitive interference during the
user relevance judgment process4. Here, the cognitive inter-
4We admit that relevance judgment can be affected by a lot of
factors, such as dynamic information needs, contents, genre and
ference means that user relevance judgment for some doc-
uments often interferes with user judgment for other docu-
ments. Our general aim is to dynamically model the cogni-
tive interference while users are scanning a ranking of doc-
uments.
The above aim is highly related to interactive IR tasks.
For example, if the users have read and explicitly or im-
plicitly judged some of the top-ranking documents, the rel-
evance scores of other documents should be revised accord-
ingly. The score revision process should consider the certain
groups/types of users’ cognitive interference, which can be
learned from the model proposed in this paper.
Basic Idea
Now, we describe the basic idea of modelling the cognitive
interference between users judging two document d0 and d1,
using the standard Markov way described in the previous
section.
Assume there are three relevance degrees, R, P , and I ,
which represent the relevance degrees relevant, partially rel-
evant and irrelevant, respectively, of a document with re-
spect to the given query q. We let relevance degrees be
judgment states of users, which correspond to the deci-
sion states in the previous section. Let a 1 × 3 row vec-
tor w = [pR, pP , pI ] be the judgment states distribution
(states distribution for short) to represent the judgment re-
sult. Specifically, pR, pP and pI represent the percentage
of users who judge the document as relevant (R), partially
relevant (P ), irrelevant (I). Let w0 be non-interfered states
distribution of document d0, and w
(α)
0 be interfered states
distribution of d0. The cognitive interference is generated
by judging another document d1, and the interference is en-
coded in a transition matrix
M(α) =
[
MRR MRP MRI
MPR MPP MPI
MIR MIP MII
]
(13)
whereMi,j (i, j ∈ {R,P, I}) represents the probabilities of
transiting from judgment state i to judgment state j. Differ-
ent interference by document d1 has different M(α), which
will be discussed later.
This M(α), which represents the cognitive interference
among judgment states, borrows the same idea from the M
in Fomula 11. Furthermore, M(α) can bridge the gap be-
tween the non-interfered states distribution w0 and inter-
fered counterpart w
(α)
0 by w
(α)
0 =w0 × M(α) 5. This is
similar to the idea that M(G) and M(B) can connect the
difference between PN and PF .
In the next section, we will adopt the probabilistic au-
tomata (PA), which is a generalization of Markov models,
even the retrieval interface. Here, we pay more attention to the
change of user relevance judgment results of documents with re-
spect to a given query. Actually, we also studied the cognitive in-
terference in the relevance judgment of the potential queries (indi-
cating user information needs) with respect to a given document,
which is out of the scope of this paper.
5Here, in order to keep the formulation simpler, we do not in-
clude the conditional probabilities.
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Figure 1: An example for Probabilistic Automaton (PA). In this
PA, the states set is S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, where s4 is the final state.
Each PA has an alphabet Σ. For each symbol α ∈ Σ, M(α) is
the transition matrix to represent the probabilities of the transition
among states.
to model the cognitive interference in the relevance judg-
ment. The reason why we adopt PA is that: firstly, PA of-
fers different input symbols, which can represent different
kinds of cognitive interference generated by viewing other
documents; secondly, PA can accept a finite string of sym-
bols, making it possible and natural to dynamically model
the cognitive interference when users are judging a ranking
of documents.
In addition, the cognitive interference modeled by quan-
tum finite automaton (QFA) will also be presented. Here, we
clarify that cognitive interference using the classical Markov
model, e.g. PA, may only be able to explain the violation of
CLTP described by Formula 1 or other similar phenomenon.
In the following, we will pay more attention to the PA, since
we think it is easier to implement in IR and it is powerful
enough for our task. On the other hand, we will further show
the potential advantages of QFA, which is more general and
powerful.
PA Modeling for Cognitive Interference
We propose to use probabilistic automaton (PA), which is a
generalization of the concept of Markovmodel, to model the
cognitive interference. We are more focused on the model
rather than examples or observations, since the difference
between non-interfered judgment and interfered judgment is
a widely-accepted fact in IR but less attention has been paid
to formal modeling of it. We first give the formal definition
of probabilistic automaton (PA).
Definition of PA Before giving the Definition 1 of PA, we
should mention that a (row) vector is stochastic if all its en-
tries are greater than or equal to 0 and sum to 1. Accordingly,
a matrix is stochastic if all its row vectors are stochastic. We
letM(m,n) be the set of all m× n stochastic matrices.
Definition 1 A probabilistic automaton (PA) U is a 5-tuple
(S,Σ,M,w, F ), where S = {s1, . . . , sm} is a finite set of
states, Σ is an input alphabet, M is a function from Σ into
M(m,m),w is a (m)-dimensional stochastic row vector, and
F ⊆ S is a set of final states.
The vectorw denotes the initial states distribution whose
kth component is the initial probability of the state sk(sk ∈
S). For each symbol α ∈ Σ, M(α) is a m ×m stochastic

	


Figure 2: Illustration of cognitive interference modeling by PA.
The states distribution of PA can represent users relevance judg-
ment. The transition matrices of PA can be used to model the cog-
nitive interference when users are judging documents.
matrix. The value M(α)k,t = Pr(sk
α−→ st) is the prob-
ability that the state sk transits to st after reading α. For
the PA, after reading α, the new states distribution becomes
wM(α). If then another symbol β ∈ Σ is read in, the next
states distribution of PA will be wM(α)M(β). Therefore,
we can extend the domain of function M from Σ to Σ∗ in
a standard way, i.e., M(αβ) = M(α)M(β), where αβ is a
string of symbols.
An indicative example of a 4-state PA is given in Figure
1. Suppose the initial distribution w = [0.5, 0.3, 0.2, 0],
and M(α) =
⎡⎢⎣ 0.6 0.35 0.05 00.1 0.9 0 00 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
⎤⎥⎦. After reading
α, the states distribution of this PA will be wM(α) =
[0.330, 0.445, 0.225, 0]. The values 0.6, 0.35, 0.05 and 0 in
the first row of this M(α) are the probabilities that s1 tran-
sits to s1, s2, s3 and s4, respectively. In general, the k
th row
inM(α) represents the probabilities that the state sk transits
to every st(st ∈ S) .
PA Representation for Users Judgment Results The
states s1, . . . , sm and their distribution in PA can repre-
sent the uses relevance judgment of a document. Recall
the example illustrated in the “Basic Idea” section. Now,
we are going to reuse the same example in the PA frame-
work. As shown in Figure 2, the PA states {s1, s2, s3, s4} =
{R,P, I, F}. R, P , and I represent the relevance degrees
(also called judgment states), relevant, partially relevant and
irrelevant, respectively, of a document with respect to the
given query q. The state F denotes that the user quits or
finishes the judging process. For the states distribution w,
the probability p1, p2, p3 or p4 corresponds to the percent-
age of users who judge the document as relevant (R), par-
tially relevant (P ), irrelevant (I), or finish the judgment (F ),
respectively.
In general, PA can represent a finite number of relevance
degrees. Let the first m−1 PA states s1, . . . , sm−1 represent
the relevance degrees which are monotonically decreasing.
That means s1 denotes totally relevant and sm−1 denotes
absolutely irrelevant. The final state sm indicates that the
user quits or finishes the relevance judgment. Then, we let
wi = [pi,1, . . . , pi,m] (14)
represent the initial relevance judgments of users with re-
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spect to di, where pi,k (k = 1, . . . ,m) denotes the proba-
bility (e.g., the percentage of users) of judging di as rele-
vance degree sk. Note that the initial judgment means that
the users only judge document di, i.e., without interference.
Cognitive Interference Modeling when Judging two Doc-
uments Now, we describe how this PA can be used to
model the process that judging a document d0 is interfered
by judging another document d1. We first map the initial
relevance judgment result to the ranking score, in order to
quantify the topical relevance of documents. Specifically,
this mapping is as follows:
ψ(di) = wi × Λ (15)
where ψ(di) is the initial relevance score of di, and Λ
is a column vector [m,m− 1, . . . , 1]T . Then, ψ(di) =∑m
k=1 pi,k× (m−k+1). This is to ensure that the more
users judged higher relevance degrees, the higher the overall
relevance score would be6.
Recall that PA has several input symbols in the alphabetΣ
and different symbols can represent different kinds of inter-
ference. Specifically, we define three input symbols, a, b and
c, which correspond to the following three conditions, i.e.,
1) ψ(d1)>ψ(d0), 2) ψ(d1)<ψ(d0) and 3) ψ(d1)=ψ(d0).
Obviously, these three conditions reflect the relative rele-
vance of two documents d1 and d0. Let another input symbol
e denote that the user will finish the relevance judgment task.
Formally, the input symbol generated by judging document
d1 is formulated as:
α(d1) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
a, ψ(d1)>ψ(d0)
b, ψ(d1)<ψ(d0)
c, ψ(d1)=ψ(d0)
e, Judgment finished
(16)
To model the process that judging d0 is interfered by judg-
ing d1, the initial states distribution of PA is set to w0 and
the input symbol is generated by judging d1. For each sym-
bol, a transition matrix M(α) will be learned from user
judgment data and reflect the states transition probabilities.
These probabilities actually reflect users cognitive interfer-
ence. For example,M(α)k,t denote that the user will change
their relevance judgment from relevance degree qk to degree
qt, after reading another document that generates an input
factor α. The whole interference process can be formulated
as
w
(α)
0 = w0 ×M(α) (17)
where w
(α)
0 is the interfered relevance judgment of d0 and
α = α(d1) is generated by judging d1.
Cognitive Interference Modeling when Judging a Rank-
ing of Documents Generally, our aim is to dynamically
model the cognitive interference of users when they are
judging a list of documents d1d2 . . . dn. This means for each
j (1 ≤ j ≤ n), PA is expected to model how the judgment
for d1d2 . . . dj interferes with the judgment for document di
(1 ≤ i ≤ n).
6There may be other choice for Λ in Equation 15, which is left
as our future work.
When we investigate the interference 7 on wi (w.r.t. di)
imposed by wj (w.r.t. dj), the initial states distribution w
of PA is set as wi, and the input symbol is generated by
judging dj using the following formula:
α(dj) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
a, ψ(dj)>ψ(di)
b, ψ(dj)<ψ(di)
c, ψ(dj)=ψ(di)
e, Judgment finished
(18)
To model the process that having judged d1d2 . . . dj
interferes with judging di (1 ≤ i ≤ n), we extend
the domain of the function M from Σ to Σ∗, as de-
scribed in first paragraph below Definition 1. After judg-
ing a ranking of documents d1d2 . . . dj , a string x =
α(d1)α(d2) . . . α(dj) is generated. Accordingly, we have
M(x) = M(α(d1)α(d2) . . . α(dj)) =
∏j
k=1 M(α(dk)).
Then, the interfered states distribution w
(x)
i of di imposed
by the judgment of d1d2 . . . dj can be obtained by
w
(x)
i = wi ×M(x). (19)
Note that the above formulation considers the presenta-
tion order of documents. Different document order gener-
ates different string x of symbols, leading to different tran-
sition matrix M(x) andw
(x)
i .
Comparing PA with other Classical Models Probabilis-
tic automaton (PA) is a non-deterministic finite automaton
(NDFA). In this section, we will justify why we choose PA,
instead of deterministic finite automaton (DFA), or other
graphical models (e.g., hidden Markov model (HMM) or
Bayesian network (BN)), to model the cognitive interfer-
ence.
Firstly, we compare PA with the deterministic finite au-
tomaton (DFA). The definition (Tzeng 1992) of DFA is as
follows:
Definition 2 A deterministic finite automaton (DFA) A is a
5-tuple (S, Σ, τ , s1, F), where S is a finite set of states, Σ is
an input alphabet, τ is a function from S×Σ into S, s1 is the
initial state, and F ⊆ S is a set of final states.
Recall that in PA, each sate can have several possible next
states after reading a symbol α. From the DFA Definition 2,
however, we can see that after reading a symbol, for every
state in DFA, the next possible state is uniquely determined.
This means that after judging another document, users will
change their judgment from one relevance degree (e.g., ab-
solutely relevant) to another unique relevance degree (e.g.,
absolutely irrelevant). Therefore, DFA cannot model the
probabilistic transition from one relevance degree to many
possible relevance degrees, which is necessary if the cogni-
tive interference modeling consider a large number of users
with different behavioral trends.
Secondly, compared to other graphical models, such
as Hidden Markov Model (HMM) and Bayesian Network
(BN), PA is also more suitable for our task. Both PA and
7Here, we say wj interferes withwi, since we think the cogni-
tive interference is on users relevance judgments.
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HMM are probabilistic finite-state machines (Vidal et al.
2005) and some link between them has been found (Dupont,
Denis, and Esposito 2005)(Vidal et al. 2005). However, it is
not straightforward to define the hidden state in our problem.
Classical Bayesian network (BN) cannot model the sequen-
tial task. Dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) (Ghahramani
1998) can model sequences of variables, but it could be too
complex to be not directly applied to our problem. Nonethe-
less, we would like to investigate how to use DBN for our
problem in the future.
QFA Modeling for Cognitive Interference
Quantum finite automata (QFA) are a quantum analog of
probabilistic automata. In this section, we describe the main
idea of QFA modeling of the cognitive interference, by pro-
viding the quantum version of the components in the PA
modeling.
Using QFA, the states are denoted as |s1〉, |s2〉, . . . , |sm〉,
where |sk〉 (1 ≤ k ≤ m) denotes the kth judgment states.
The states distribution for the document di is denoted as
|wi〉 = [qi,1, qi,2, . . . , qi,m], where qi,k denotes the ampli-
tude of the kth judgment state, and |qi,k|2 = pi,k in For-
mula 14. We adopt the same mapping function ψ(di) in
Formula 15 and the interference symbol generation function
in Formula 18 for QFA modeling. For each input symbol
α, the corresponding quantum transition matrix is a unitary
matrix U(α). We denote the interfered states distribution as
|wαi 〉, where
|wαi 〉 = |wi〉U(α) (20)
After judging a ranking of documents that generate a se-
quence of interference input symbol, denoted as x =
α(d1)α(d2) . . . α(dj), the interfered states distribution for
document di is:
|wxi 〉 = |wi〉U(x) (21)
where U(x) =
∏j
k=1 U(α(dk)). Note that the above quan-
tum Markov process is different to that proposed by (Buse-
meyer, Wang, and Lambert-Mogiliansky 2009), in the sense
that the former is the transition of judgment states, while the
latter is the transition from category to decision states.
The above quantum formulation has its advantage in that
the quantum probabilities naturally do not need to obey clas-
sical probability law, e.g. CLTP. On the other hand, PA may
just be able to explain the violation of CLTP in the sense
of the difference between the non-interfered (or initial) and
interfered states distribution. Moreover, we consider that
QFA is stronger than PA in that QFA can naturally offer (po-
tentially) infinite memory and the corresponding processing
ability. Note that, being aided by (potentially) infinite exter-
nal storage and dominated by inductive and abstract ability,
the cognitive process of human being can handle, at least
to some extent, (potentially) infinite information. Hence,
QFA would potentially make a more general and powerful
approach to model the cognitive process.
Case Study
We designed and carried out a pilot user study to investi-
gate the cognitive interference when users are judging two
documents. In this study, five queries were selected. They
are (1) “Albert Einstein”, (2) “Probability”, (3) “Semantic
Web”, (4) “Graphical Model”, and (5) “Quantum Mechan-
ics”. The number of queries is small, since the users are
often more careful if the task does not take them too much
time. For each query, three Wikipedia pages with different
relevance degrees were chosen. Recall that PA can model
a finite number of relevance degrees. Here, the relevance
degrees are ranged from A to E, where A means “totally
relevant” and E means “absolutely irrelevant”, then S is
{A,B,C,D,E}. We fixed one page as d0 (which is mostly
likely to be partially relevant, i.e. B, C, or D) , and d1 is
randomly selected from the other two pages before the user
judge d0.
The users were divided into 2 distinct groups. For each
query, we let users in group 1 judge d0 only (to obtainw0),
and users in group 2 judge d1 at first (to obtainw1) and then
d0 (to obtainw
(α)
0 ). The reason why we split users into two
groups is to avoid any user reading d0 twice. Users were
required to mark the relevance degree from A to E.
The study was carried out through the Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk, which is an Amazon Web service that enables on-
line user studies to be “crowdsourced” to a large number of
users quickly and economically. To gain a better controlla-
bility of user experiments, it is important to detect suspicious
responses (Kittur, Chi, and Suh 2008). Therefore, in our ex-
periment, we removed the data of users who are considered
as not reliable in terms of, e.g., without completing most of
the queries and without viewing any document for more than
a certain time interval. Eventually, for each group, the data
of 30 Mechanical Turk users were collected.
At first, we would like to test whether there exists cog-
nitive interference in group 2. We denote the initial judg-
ment result (i.e., without interference) of d0 in group 1 as
w0, and the judgment result of d0 in group 2 as w˜0 to in-
dicate the potential interference. We then use Euclidean
distance d(w0, w˜0) to measure the difference between w0
and w˜0. The difference for each query is summarized in
Table 1. We can observe that the difference is obvious for
every query and indicates the existence of the cognitive in-
terference. More specifically, we found that users tended
to lower their relevance degrees of the current document af-
ter they viewed a more relevance document, and vise versa.
Generally, the initial relevance judgmentw0 on a document
d0 does not hold anymore, once the interference from judg-
ing other documents takes effect, leading to the interfered
judgment w˜0.
This has practical implications in scenarios such as: after
users have judged some documents, the retrieval system is
expected to be able to dynamically re-rank other documents
according to the interfered relevance. Hence, it is necessary
to derive a more reasonable estimation, rather than w0, for
the real interfered relevance result w˜0.
It is natural to use w
(α)
0 by Equation 17 to estimate
w˜0. Then, we need to test if d(w
(α)
0 , w˜0) is smaller than
d(w0, w˜0), where w0 is used as a baseline for w˜0. If this
is true, we can conclude that w
(α)
0 , computed from the pro-
posed PA approach, is a better estimation of w˜0.
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Table 1: The Difference between Initial and Interfered Judg-
ment of d0
Query #1 #2 #3 #4 #5
d(w0, w˜0) 0.3713 0.2062 0.2962 0.2708 0.1499
Table 2: The Difference between (Estimated) Interfered and
(Real) Interfered Judgment of d0
Query #1 #2 #3 #4 #5
d(w
(α)
0 , w˜0) 0.2323 0.1404 0.2306 0.1833 0.1266
In order to do this test, we assumed that 75% of users
data were available and used them for the training of tran-
sition matrices M(α). The other 25% of users data was
used to test whether w
(α)
0 is a better estimation of w˜0.
4-fold cross validation was carried out. For training the
transition matrix M(α), we simply calculated probabilities
Pr{sk α−→ st}, by simulating states transition from users
data between two groups. Then, we use the trainedM(α) to
compute w
(α)
0 = w0M(α). The difference between w
(α)
0
and w˜0 for each query
8 are in Table 2. It can be observed
that d(w
(α)
0 , w˜0) is much smaller than d(w0, w˜0) almost for
every query. This implies the potential usefulness of our
model for predicting the interfered judgment of users. To
the best of our knowledge, there is yet no other result to
compare with. We report our first results on real user data.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed an alternative Markov ap-
proach to explain the quantum-like cognitive interference
(in the form of violation of the classical law of total prob-
ability) in human decision making which underpins users’
relevance judgment process in information retrieval. Then,
we proposed to use probabilistic automaton (PA) and quan-
tum finite automaton (QFA) to dynamically model the cog-
nitive interference of users when they are judging a list of
documents. A quantitative case study on the real users rel-
evance judgment data collected through a task-based user
study demonstrated the suitability and feasibility of the PA
modeling for cognitive interference.
In the future, we will investigate in-depth the difference
between PA and QFA for cognitive interference modeling.
We also need to consider the exact quantity of relevance
score differences, and the statistical dependency among doc-
uments in the modeling. Moreover, we will refine our ex-
perimental set-up according to our general aim, and recruit
more users in the relevance judgment experiment.
Additional Authors
Massimo Melucci (University of Padua, email:
melo@dei.unipd.it), and John McCall (The Robert
8Note that in the real application, it is not necessary to have one
transition matrix for only one query. Instead, it is reasonable to
learn a transition matrix for a number of queries
Gordon University, email: jm@comp.rgu.ac.uk)
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Leszek Kaliciak and anonymous
reviewers for their constructive comments. This work
is supported in part by the UK’s EPSRC grant (No.:
EP/F014708/2).
References
Bruza, P., and Cole, R. J. 2005. Quantum logic of seman-
tic space: An exploratory investigation of context effects in
practical reasoning. We will Show Them! Essays in Honour
of Dov Gabbay 1:339–362, College Publications.
Busemeyer, J. R., andWang, Z. 2007. Quantum information
processing explanation for interactions between inferences
and decisions. In Proceedings of the AAAI Symposium on
Quantum Interaction. AAAI Press.
Busemeyer, J. R.; Wang, Z.; and Lambert-Mogiliansky, A.
2009. Empirical comparison of markov and quantummodels
of decision making. Journal of Mathematical Psychology
53:423–433.
Dupont, P.; Denis, F.; and Esposito, Y. 2005. Links between
probabilistic automata and hiddenmarkovmodels: probabil-
ity distributions, learning models and induction algorithms.
Pattern Recognition 38(9):1349–1371.
Eisenberg, M., and Barry, C. 1988. Order effects: A study
of the possible influence of presentation order on user judg-
ments of document relevance. Journal of the American So-
ciety for Information Science 39(5):293 – 300.
Ghahramani, Z. 1998. Learning dynamic bayesian net-
works. In Adaptive Processing of Sequences andData Struc-
tures, 168–197. Springer-Verlag.
Hou, Y., and Song, D. 2009. Characterizing pure high-order
entanglements in lexical semantic spaces via information ge-
ometry. In Proceedings of the Third Quantum Interaction
Symposium, 237–250.
Khrennikov, A. 2004. On quantum-like probabilistic struc-
ture of mental information. Open Systems and Information
Dynamics 11(3):267–275.
Kittur, A.; Chi, E. H.; and Suh, B. 2008. Crowdsourcing for
usability: Using micro-task markets for rapid, remote, and
low-cost user measurements. In ACM CHI 2008, 453–456.
Kondacs, A., and Watrous, J. 1997. On the power of quan-
tum finite state automata. In Proceedings of the 38th IEEE
Conference on Foundations of Computer Science, 66–75.
Melucci, M. 2008. A basis for information retrieval in con-
text. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. 26(3):1–41.
Melucci, M. 2010. An investigation of quantum interference
in informaiton retrieval. In IRF 10, In press.
Mizzaro, S. 1996. Relevance: The whole (hi)story. Jour-
nal of the American Society for Information Science 48:810–
832.
Piwowarski, B., and Lalmas, M. 2009a. Structured infor-
mation retrieval and quantum theory. In Proceedings of the
Third Quantum Interaction Symposium, 289–298.
132
Piwowarski, B., and Lalmas, M. 2009b. A quantum-based
model for interactive information retrieval. In Proceeedings
of the 2nd International Conference on the Theory of Infor-
mation Retrieval, volume 5766. Springer.
Tzeng, W.-G. 1992. Learning probabilistic automata and
markov chains via queries. Machine Learning 8:151–166.
van Rijsbergen, C. J. 2004. The Geometry of Informa-
tion Retrieval. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University
Press.
Vidal, E.; Thollard, F.; de la Higuera, C.; Casacuberta,
F.; and Carrasco, R. C. 2005. Probabilistic finite-state
machines-part i. IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell.
27(7):1013–1025.
Zuccon, G., and Azzopardi, L. 2010. Using the quantum
probability ranking principle to rank interdependent docu-
ments. In Proceedings of the 32nd European Conference on
Information Retrieval, 357–369.
Zuccon, G.; Azzopardi, L.; and van Rijsbergen, C. J. 2009.
The quantum probability ranking principle for information
retrieval. In Proceeedings of the 2nd International Confer-
ence on the Theory of Information Retrieval, 232–240.
133
